Capital Market Governance: How Do Security Laws Affect Market Performance?

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In Short Supply: Short Sellers and Stock Returns (2015, unknown): “Globally, the introduction of short-selling in international markets is associated with a lowering of country-level costs-of-capital, an increase in market liquidity, and an improvement in overall pricing efficiency (Daouk et al. 2006; Bris et al. 2007).”
Institutional Determinants of Capital Structure Adjustment Speeds (2012, background): “Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2006) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) show that transaction costs are higher in stock markets in which insiders trade with impunity, and so we also use the strength of insider trading laws as a proxy for the quality of capital market governance.”
Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization (2009, background): “Several authors (see, e.g., Giannetti and Simonov (2006), Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005), Daouk et al. (2006), Leuz et al. (2009), Kim, Sung, and Wei (2008), and Li, Ortiz-Molina, and Zhao (2008)) show that PIs hold less equity in companies and countries with weaker corporate governance,…”