Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behavior with Endogenously-determined Balance of Power

By Kaushik Basu. 2004

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Gender Studies, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/671b6c085a17a163feef47cf63831ac85ad7e864

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Citations in the corpus

Disentangling Bargaining Power from Individual and Household Level to Institutions: Evidence on Women’s Position in Ethiopia (2010, background): “Moreover, as Kaushik Basu (2006) has recently argued, bargaining power and bargaining outcomes affect each other in a two-way relationship, so that household bargaining is a complex endogenous process going well beyond individual bargaining power.”
Does female empowerment promote economic development? (2011, unknown): “…and Udry 2004).6 4 Studies that feature a preference gap between husband and wife include Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Anderson and Baland (2002), Basu (2006), Atkin (2009), Bobonis (2009), Browning et al. (2010), and Attanasio and Lechene (2014), although none of these papers explicitly…”
Families in Macroeconomics (2016, unknown): “bn Basu (2006) also explores the implications of endogenous bargaining power, albeit in a different context. We are interested in how bargaining power changes across generations, while Basu (2006) analyzes the dynamic implications for a given couple.”
Cycling to School: Increasing Secondary School Enrollment for Girls in India (2013, background): “As Basu (2006) notes, patriarchal social norms may lead to a girl’s share of household resources being more likely to be directed toward saving for marriage rather than towards investments that may dynamically improve female bargaining power over time in the community.”
Sharing of Resources Within the Family and the Economics of Household Decision Making (2013, unknown): “…grounds that aspirations and expectations are adaptive so that individuals may get used to getting a poor share; this limitation is particularly relevant when considering intra-household distributional questions (Sen, 1990), though adaptation has been taken into account in some models (Basu, 2006).”
Intrahousehold Bargaining, Female Autonomy, and Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from India (2020, background): “In many traditional and conservative societies, the husband may consider his “pride” hurt if his wife goes out to work or forbid her from working to keep her bargaining power low (Basu, 2006).”
Is the Allocation of Resources within the Household Efficient? New Evidence from a Randomized Experiment (2009, background): “…resource allocation decisions may be Pareto inefficient as a result of the imperfect enforceability of marital contracts (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 2003; Ligon 2002; Basu 2006) or because of information asymmetries among partners within households (Bloch and Rao 2002; Ashraf, forthcoming).”
Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: What Is the Relationship? What Can Be Done? (2006, background): “Even within the household there is often a lot of inequality, and this is especially significant for households that have internal conflicts of interest (Basu, 2005).”
Women's Power, Conditional Cash Transfers, and Schooling in Nicaragua (2008, background): “Basu (2006) in an intra-household theoretical framework demonstrates that if female power is above that of the male's then she will garner a greater share of the income produced by child labor.”
What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh (2009, background): “Assuming that theseutilities are cardinal we posit, as in Basu (2006), that in their cooperative endeavour, the couple jointly makes its choices to maximize the objective function αUf+(1−α)Um, with 0≤α≤1.”
Financing from Family and Friends (2016, unknown): “…Udry, 1996; Duflo and Udry, 2004; Ashraf, 2009; Ashraf et al., 2010); and Schaner, 2012), and several studies propose alternative household models in which intrafamily conflicts entail inefficiencies (e.g., Konrad and Lommerud, 1995; Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; Basu, 2006; and Hertzberg, 2012).”