Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control

By D. Neven, L. Röller. 2005

180 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66ad2cbb04e5f295906d4059b754a160a7492c88

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. B. Lyons

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. B. Lyons

In Media Technology

1. B. Lyons

Citations in the corpus

• An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform (2013, unknown): “For such a discussion see Motta (2004) and Neven and Röller (2005).”
• Could Politicians Be More Right Than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards (2003, background): “Neven and Roller are insufficiently clear about the personal benefits that lobbyists are able to give regulators (e.g. it seems plausible that a regulator who has a reputation for being tough on firms may attract the highest wage offers when he or she chooses to leave the regulator and enter the pri”