Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study

By William Q. Judge, I. Naoumova, Nadejda Koutzevol. 2003

226 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/668ce24149cd45e5a7970127da96ea4b1903a109

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In Accounting

1. Monomita Nandy
2. J. Chen
3. Suman Lodh
4. Mohammad Alipour

Citations in the corpus

• Innovation and Family Ownership: Empirical Evidence from India (2014, background): “Khanna and Palepu (2000b) empirically show that affiliation with large Indian business groups increases firm performance by overcoming external institutional underdevelopment in the Indian market. As a result, these business groups can also mitigate the cost of their diversification because they res”
• Board Structure and Corporate Performance in Malaysia (2009, background): “Furthermore, as argued by Judge et al. (2003), even with the existence of a formal law that separates the roles of CEO and the chairperson, informal activities may still undermine the law and firm performance.”
• State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies (2013, unknown): “A firm’s assets or employee numbers have been widely used in the literature to measure firm size, as in studies by Judge et al. (2003), Dahya and McConnell (2007), Ehikioya (2009), Faleye (2007) and Elsayed (2007).”
• Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of Venezuela (2008, unknown): “Results presented here suggest that firms in Venezuela may reduce their cost of capital and enhance their market valuation when they improve their corporate governance practices, a finding that is consistent with the theoretical model presented in La Porta et al. (2002), where the positive effects o”
• Board Composition and Firm Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh (2010, unknown): “The relationship between outside directors and firms’ performance is not clear explicitly in case of developed economies (Judge et al., 2003).”