The Client Is King: Do Mutual Fund Relationships Bias Analyst Recommendations?
By Michael Firth, Chen Lin, Ping Liu, Yuhai Xuan. 2013
199 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/667f492a8b1cfca10d0fd9ce9e34aee363ec089d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Zhihong Yi
- T. Wong
- Kam C. Chan
- Nianhang Xu
- Xuanyu Jiang
- Omrane Guedhami
- Xing-qiang Du
- Jeffrey A. Pittman
In Finance
- Zhihong Yi
- T. Wong
- Kam C. Chan
- Nianhang Xu
- Xuanyu Jiang
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Katherine Schipper
- L. Doukakis
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “As discussed earlier, Gao et al. [2014] find that weak corporate governance of mutual funds leads to fund managers exploiting their social ties with investees for opportunistic behavior.”
- Analyst coverage, optimism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China (2013, methodology): “Second, we provide additional insight into the role of conflicts of interest (Ljungqvist et al., 2007; Mehran and Stulz, 2007; Firth et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2013) and reputation (Hong et al.”