Competition and Financial Stability

By Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale. 2004

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/65e39567201141abbec0887f8fa4407c4e38b98d

Citations in the corpus

• Banking Competition and Capital Ratios (2007, unknown): “(2006) suggest that allowing for competition in lending markets is likely to increase stability; whereas Allen and Gale (2004) highlight that the relationship between competition and stability in banking is multifaceted, with no simple trade-off between the two.”
• How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability (2012, unknown): “Allen and Gale (2004) also show that competition –stability relationship can be complex, where competition can also increase stability.”
• Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation (2014, unknown): “22 liquidity is a public good and then sound banks may have an incentive to provide liquidity to a bank in trouble to avoid contagion (Allen and Gale (2004), Sáez and Shi (2004)) or may impede it (as banks with surplus funds underprovide lending strategically to induce fire-sales of bank-specific as”
• The Cost of Banking Regulation (2006, unknown): “The advantage of our research design is the exogeneity of the tightness of regulation, which gives us an opportunity to shed some empirical light on the trade off between banking competition and banking stability studied by Allen and Gale (2004).”
• How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, unknown): “In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Allen and Gale (2004), Boot and Marinc (2008), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011), and Mehran and Thakor (2011), banks derive a competitive advantage from higher capital. These papers imply that higher-capital banks end up with higher market shares. This prediction a”
• Bank Competition and Financial Stability (2008, unknown): “the risk of fragility (Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Allen and Gale, (2000, 2004) .”
• Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Much Ado About Nothing? (2015, unknown): “In addition, in competitive systems the incentives of banks to properly screen borrowers are reduced, which again contributes to system fragility (Allen and Gale, 2000; Allen and Gale, 2004; Boot and Thakor, 1993).”
• Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus (2013, unknown): “Higher market power may lead to lower risk because more concentrated banking systems reduce incentives of bankers to lend recklessly, and because more concentrated systems can be supervised more effectively by regulators (Allen and Gale, 2004).”
• A Survival Analysis of Islamic and Conventional Banks (2016, unknown): “Another view contends that larger profits in more concentrated banking sectors moderate the banks’ risk-taking behavior (Allen and Gale 2004).”
• Banks without Parachutes – Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies (2010, unknown): “2See also Allen and Gale (2004).”
• Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies (2011, unknown): “Assume that the bank’s portfolio yields y with probability q(y), and zero otherwise (as in Allen and Gale, 2004).”
• Banking stability determinants in Africa (2018, unknown): “BCON variable measures banking concentration and we do not have a definite prediction for the impact of banking concentration on banking stability as indicated by opposing arguments already discussed in the literature review (see, Mishkin, 1999; Allen and Gale 2004; Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). Next, ”