Contributions to the theory of games
By H. Kuhn, A. W. Tucker, M. Dresher, Philip Wolfe, R. Luce, H. F. Bohnenblust. 1953
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Citations in the corpus
- Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems (2012, neutral): “2.1 Optimism in face of uncertainty 9 2.2 Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) strategies 10 2.3 Lower bound 12 2.4 Refinements and bibliographic remarks 16”
- Heads-up limit hold’em poker is solved (2015, background): “Borel’s (12) and von Neumann’s (13,14) foundational works were motivated by developing a mathematical rationale for bluffing in poker, and small synthetic poker games (15) were commonplace in many early papers (12,14,16,17).”
- Optimal transportation, topology and uniqueness (2010, unknown): “44 19 v1 [ m at h. PR ] 2 6 A ug 2 01 0 Optimal transportation, topology and uniqueness∗† Najma Ahmad‡, Hwa Kil Kim§, and Robert J. McCann¶ August 27, 2010”
- Explainability in Graph Neural Networks: A Taxonomic Survey (2020, methodology): “In addition, it employs Shapley value [70] as the reward of MCTS to measure the importance of subgraphs and proposes an efficient approximation of Shapley value by only considering the interactions within message passing range.”
- On the existence of strong Nash equilibria (2014, unknown): “The results are illustrated with applications to economies with multilateral environmental externalities and to the simple oligopoly static model.”