An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries

By Yehuda Lindell, Benny Pinkas. 2014

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Citations in the corpus

A Comprehensive Comparison of Multiparty Secure Additions with Differential Privacy (2015, background): “protocol has been extended to securemultiparty computations in [31] and to scenarioswith active adversaries [38].”
DeepSecure: Scalable Provably-Secure Deep Learning (2017, methodology): “Our solution can be readily modified to support malicious models by following the methodologies presented in [18–21].”
A taxonomy of privacy-preserving record linkage techniques (2013, background): “In particular, malicious parties may refuse to participate in a protocol, not follow the protocol in the speciﬁed way, choose arbitrary values for their data inputs, or abort the protocol at any time [84].”
GraphSC: Parallel Secure Computation Made Easy (2015, methodology): “Our focus is on the semi-honest model, although this can be extended with existing techniques [6], [68].”
Quid-Pro-Quo-tocols: Strengthening Semi-honest Protocols with Dual Execution (2012, methodology): “Several approaches have been proposed for achieving security against malicious adversaries [11, 22, 25, 33, 35, 27, 24, 32], some of which have been implemented [28, 34, 35, 32].”
Fast Cut-and-Choose-Based Protocols for Malicious and Covert Adversaries (2013, methodology): “These include protocols that require exponentiations for every gate in the circuit [19,30] (these can be reasonable for small circuits but not large ones with tens or hundreds of thousands of gates), protocols that use the “cut-and-choose” technique on garbled circuits [23,24,27,31], and more [3, 6,”
Foundations of garbled circuits (2012, background): “…prv Φ size sym encryption FM06 [44] 2-party SFE (malicious) prv Φ circ OT, commitment AL07 [8] 2-party SFE (covert) prv Φ circ OT, commitment LP07 [40] 2-party SFE (malicious) prv Φ circ OT, commitment GKR08 [23] one-time programs prv2 Φ size none (model provides one-time memory) GMS08 [24]…”