Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties

By A. Guzman. 2009

313 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/654873cd004eef26139f09c037cf0204115e4605

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Citations in the corpus

Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000 (2004, background): “9 Guzman 1998. compensation in the event of expropriation.”
Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment (2016, background): “DIRECT INVESTMENT Previous research on foreign direct investment (FDI) argues that host governments face a commitment problem (Guzman, 1998; Jensen et al., 2012).3 Before receiving an investment, host governments have incentives to promise favorable treatment to a foreign investor.”
When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning (2013, unknown): “Combined with the fact that participation is a repeated decision for state, his provides a unique opportunity to 1 E.g. Van Harten 2007; Schneiderman 2008; Montt 2009; Schill 2009.”
Ratification counts: US investment treaties and FDI flows into developing countries (2010, background): “Some scholars and practitioners point out that the network of bilateral treaties leads to undesirable competition between developing countries to the benefit of the more developed countries (Guzman, 1998; Van Harten 2005; but see Bubb and Rose-Ackerman, 2007).”
Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries (2005, background): “The FCN treaties had the expansion of international trade and the improvement of US foreign relations as their prime purpose, even though some investment provisions were later added (Guzman 1998).”