Credit-Rating Shopping, Selection and the Equilibrium Structure of Ratings

119 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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The Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings (2014, background): “In contrast, Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2009) demonstrate that when investors are rational, shopping-induced ratings inflation does not have any adverse consequences.”
Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation (2013, unknown): “Our model highlights the need for an 7 If selection were properly accounted for by investors, as in Sangiorgi and Spatt (2010), the phenomenon of shopping induced rating ination would not have any adverse consequences.”
Revolving Doors on Wall Street (2016, background): “Theory papers modeling the issuer-pays structure include Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2009), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012), Bongaerts (2013), and Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014).”
The Credit Rating Crisis (2009, unknown): “Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2009) develop a model in which rating shopping is motivated by the regulatory advantages of high ratings.”