The devil in the details : asymptotic reasoning in explanation, reduction, and emergence

By Robert W. Batterman. 2001

567 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/64d9f8b30bafcfb4a392aa451392fef0297c28e5

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In History and Philosophy of Science

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Citations in the corpus

Pseudospectrum and Black Hole Quasinormal Mode Instability (2020, background): “[98] Such an approach is very much in the spirit of the “asymptotic reasoning” advocated in [108], where asymptotic analysis is understood as an efficient and systematic tool to unveil structurally stable patterns underlying universality behaviour.”
The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally (2004, background): “18 For a broadly similar view of idealization, see Batterman (2002).”
Towards a unified science of cultural evolution. (2006, background): “It is standard practice in physics, particularly in the search for what are called “universalities” (see Morgan & Morrison 1999; Batterman 2002).”
Why Attention is Not Explanation: Surgical Intervention and Causal Reasoning about Neural Models (2020, background): “Explanations are built by connecting models to phenomena via a “justiﬁcatory step,” whose details will be particular to the case at hand.”
Non-reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom (2010, unknown): “Here I refer to Batterman’s (1998) explanation of SM’s success in”
Compendium of the Foundations of Classical Statistical Physics (2007, background): “Thus, the foundations of statistical physics also provides a testing ground for philosophical ideas about inter-theory relations, like reduction (cf. Brush 1977, Sklar 1993, Batterman 2002).”
Between classical and quantum (2005, unknown): “, Scheibe (1999) and Batterman (2002).”
“Explain” in scientific discourse (2013, background): “2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005), asymptotic (Batterman 2002), and model-based explanations (Bokulich 2009).”
Abstract Explanations in Science (2015, background): “(Batterman [2010]) pursues these issues independently of their tie to indispensability arguments.”
A free energy principle for a particular physics (2019, background): “sal dynamics; or as epistemological, i.e., as the claim that we could not have predicted (a priori) the higher-order dynamics from our theories about lower-order dynamics (Ayala and Dobzhansky, 1974; Batterman, 2001; Bedau, 2002). The (strong) ontological flavour of this position endorses the view t”
Minimal Model Explanations (2014, background): “However, there are several reasons why the explanation provided by a model might be improved by removing various details concerning causal mechanisms ðCartwright 1983; Batterman 2002b, 2009, 2010; Rice 2012, 2013Þ.”
Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Matters* (2012, background): “For an entry into this literature, see Liu (1999), Callender (2001), Batterman (2002, 2005, 2010, 2011), Belot (2005), Jones (2006), Butterfield (2011a, 2011b), Butterfield and Bouatta (2011), and Menon and Callender (2011).”