A parameterized family of equilibrium profiles for three-player kuhn poker
By Duane Szafron, Richard G. Gibson, Nathan R Sturtevant. 2013
25 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper presents a parameterized family of equilibrium strategy profiles for three-player Kuhn poker. This family illustrates an important feature of three-player equilibrium profiles that is not present in two-player equilibrium profiles - the ability of one player to transfer utility to a second player at the expense of the third player, while playing a strategy in the profile family. This family of strategy profiles was derived analytically and the proof that the members of this family are equilibrium profiles is an analytic one. In addition, the problem of selecting a robust strategy from an equilibrium profile is discussed.
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- Julien Pérolat
- Shayegan Omidshafiei
- Marc Lanctot
- R´emi Munos
- Karl Tuyls
- Wojciech M. Czarnecki
- Zhuoran Yang
- Jean-Baptiste Lespiau
Citations in the corpus
- α-Rank: Multi-Agent Evaluation by Evolution (2019, background): “The three-player game has a significantly more complex landscape [67].”