Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion

By Jane G. Gravelle. National tax journal, 2009

464 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries, often referred to as tax havens. Tax havens are located around the world with concentrations in the Caribbean and Europe. Corporate profit shifting may cost up to $60 billion in revenue and remedies are likely to involve tax law changes. Individual income tax losses more often arise from tax evasion, and are facilitated by the lack of information reporting; remedies involve administrative changes, especially in requirements for information reporting. Losses may be as much as $70 billion per year.

Subfields: Accounting, Law

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63f8f62b25ec95fd8346a11f3dca56336d338c3f

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Citations in the corpus

Redrawing the Map of Global Capital Flows: The Role of Cross-Border Financing and Tax Havens (2020, unknown): “Our article contributes to a growing literature on the economic impact of tax havens, including Hines and Rice (1994), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), Gravelle (2009), Zucman (2013), Guvenen et al. (2018), and Tørsløv, Wier, and Zucman (2018).”
Global distribution of revenue loss from corporate tax avoidance: re‐estimation and country results (2018, methodology): “In short, we use the two lists, based on Gravelle (2013) and Cobham and Janský (2017), as two alternatives and robustness checks for each other, rather than preferring one strongly over the other.”
Going to Haven? Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance (2019, background): “Congressional Report, the government loses $10 billion to $60 billion per year in estimated tax revenues when corporations shift profits to offshore entities (Gravelle 2015).”
Does Information Asymmetry Affect Corporate Tax Aggressiveness? (2017, unknown): “16 Note that we cannot use the long-term measure of tax effective rates (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008)) as we find that our exogenous events are temporary shocks to the firms and the effects disappear after 3 years, which is consistent with Derrien and Kecskes (2013).”
Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013, background): “A report of the United States Congressional Research Service (Gravelle, 2010) concludes that there is ample and clear evidence that profits appear in countries inconsistent with an economic motivation.”
Determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness: empirical evidence from Australian firms (2013, methodology): “intellectual property and R&D expenditure) to group entities (Grubert, 2003; Grubert and Mutti, 2007; Gravelle, 2010). Since intangible assets are difficult to value, the transfer of payments (i.e. the royalties attributed to intangibles) are also difficult to value at arm’s length prices (Gravelle,”
Unprofitable Affiliates and Income Shifting Behavior (2016, background): “and Edgerton (2010) shows that firms with loss carryforwards elect bonus depreciation less frequently than fully taxable firms.”
Exploring the Role Delaware Plays as a Domestic Tax Haven (2013, background): “Foreign governments likely see Delaware as having tax haven characteristics because of its lack of reporting requirements, lack of ownership records, and failure to tax passive income paid to foreign entities (Gravelle, 2009).”
The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors? (2013, background): “In the United States, the IRS estimates that personal income tax evasion through offshore accounts and hedge funds might cost up to $70 billion annually (Gravelle 2009).”