The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity

By H. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins, William R. Kinney, Ryan Lafond. 2009

804 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63dad6278428c16372d4d0745b60677aebd6deb6

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Citations in the corpus

Enterprise Risk Management and the Cost of Capital (2016, positive): “, 2005; Francis, Khurana, and Pereira, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). In an alternative model based on a market microstructure framework, Easley and O’Hara (2004) also come to the conclusion that increasing the amount of reliable information available to investors reduces the cost of capital. ”
Internal Control and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China (2017, background): “Specifically, several studies document that firms with ICW are charged a higher cost of equity (Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghunandan, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), public debt (Dhaliwal et al.”
Does investment efficiency improve after the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (2013, background): “…document the benefits of these requirements such as providing information to the executive labor market (Li et al., 2010), improving the quality of financial reporting (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010), and reducing the cost of capital for firms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2011).”
The Implied Cost of Capital: A New Approach (2012, neutral): “, 2009) and to study the impact of corporate governance and disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2005b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), legal institutions and market regulations (Hail and Leuz, 2006), cross-listings (Hail and Leuz, 2009), taxes (Dhaliwal et al.”
Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, positive): “…qualitatively similar if we exclude the intercept—that is, the sign and statistical significance levels of PostClawback are similar to those reported in Table 2, Panel B.6 Finally, we follow Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) to performance-adjust the discretionary accruals obtained from Equation (2).”
Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital (2016, methodology): “Columns 4-6 present the results from the same regression models as those in columns 1-3, but we follow prior literature and include equity beta and idiosyncratic risk as control variables (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Chen, Chen, and Wei, 2011).”