Screening Disability Insurance Applications

By P. Jong, M. Lindeboom, B. Klaauw. Social Science Research Network, 2006

131 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6395cf4fd7094cd8a8c0fe6e1dc2ff9456c9d48c

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In Demography

  1. Eric French
  2. Ricardo Pérez Mora
  3. Iliana Reggio
  4. Josef Zweimüller
  5. Jae Song
  6. S. Kitao
  7. Michael P. Keane
  8. Josep Pijoan-Mas

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Eric French
  2. Ricardo Pérez Mora
  3. Iliana Reggio
  4. Josef Zweimüller
  5. S. Staubli
  6. Lukas Inderbitzin
  7. Jae Song

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