Labels and event processes in the asbestos operating system

By P. Efstathopoulos, Maxwell N. Krohn, Steve Vandebogart, C. Frey, David Ziegler, Eddie Kohler, David Mazières, Frans Kaashoek, Robert Morris. Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2005

421 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/635606f13d8a9206964c9981d04d0c063ee9344d

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Citations in the corpus

QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems (2011, background): “Systems like DEFCon [17] and Asbestos [27] use DIFC mechanisms to dynamically apply security labels and track the taint of events moving through a distributed system.”
Making information flow explicit in HiStar (2006, methodology): “Mechanisms in several other systems, including SELinux [11], EROS [23], and Asbestos [5], are also capable of isolating an untrusted virus scanner.”
SLEUTH: Real-time Attack Scenario Reconstruction from COTS Audit Data (2018, background): “While most above works centralize IFC, decentralized IFC (DIFC) techniques [59, 17, 28] emphasize the ability of principals to define and create new labels.”
Airavat: Security and Privacy for MapReduce (2010, methodology): “MAC systems include mainstream implementations such as SELinux [37] and AppArmor [1] which appear in Linux distributions, as well as research prototypes [45, 49, 51] which implement a MAC security model called decentralized information ﬂow control (DIFC).”
Information flow control for standard OS abstractions (2007, background): “Existing DIFC systems operate as programming lan u ge abstractions [24] or are integrated into communication pri mitives in new operating systems [8, 38].”
CHEX: statically vetting Android apps for component hijacking vulnerabilities (2012, neutral): “Security mechanism based on information flows, such as JIF [29], HiStar [34] and Asbestos [13], are also related in that our work define and detect component hijacking by means of data-flow policies, despite that we do not enforce the policies in runtime.”
FlowFence: Practical Data Protection for Emerging IoT Application Frameworks (2016, background): “FlowFence builds on substantial prior work on information flow control that use labeling architectures [52, 42, 18, 71, 63, 28, 62, 41, 15, 38, 46].”
Analyzing inter-application communication in Android (2011, background): “, which applications communicate and how they communicate) to the OS or a language runtime, which then enforces the policies [19, 23, 28, 10].”
Permission Re-Delegation: Attacks and Defenses (2011, background): “Decentralized information ﬂow control (DIFC) lets applications explicitly express their information ﬂow policies to the operating system or a language runtime, which then enforces the policies [30, 26, 39, 11].”