Environmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibility
By S. Felder, Reto Schleiniger. 2000
147 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Although market-based environmental measures like uniform CO2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost, they do not prevail in real world policies. An effciency oriented environmental policy fails, as it involves a redistributen of pollution rights, resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents. The present paper analyzes the tradoff between efficiency and political feasibility of several CO2 tax and reimbursement schemes, using a computable general equilibrium model of Switzerland. The simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform CO2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/625cabe542310d3322947eeef19071092259abc3
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Armin Falk
- Ernst Fehr
- Thomas J. Dohmen
- Gary Charness
- Michael Kosfeld
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Alois Stutzer
- Roman M. Sheremeta
Citations in the corpus
- Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political Economy of Reporting Climate Aid (2011, unknown): “In line with most of the literature on the political economy of environmental policy making, we do not distinguish between the administrative side and the political side of government (see e.g., Blanke, 2002; Felder & Schleiniger, 2002; Hicks et al., 2008; List & Sturm, 2006).”
- Homo Oeconomicus versus Homo Reciprocans: Ansätze für ein neues Wirtschaftspolitisches Leitbild? (2003, background): “Aus diesem Grund prognostiziert die Standardtheorie, dass erstens in beiden Bedingungen niemand etwas zum öffentlichen Gut beiträgt und dass zweitens unter der Strafbedingung niemand einen anderen Teilnehmer straft.(13)”
- The Public Acceptance of Green Taxes: 2 Million Voters Express Their Opinion (2004, unknown): “And there is a literature testing political feasibility by looking at costs and net payments for polluters (firms), e.g., Felder and Schleiniger (2001) .”