The Inequality of Influence

By J. Hellman, Daniel A. Kaufmann. 2002

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/61e60ba3f87deb1433bf50f5a83b5a1173b80e27

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Nathan M. Jensen
2. Pedro C. Vicente
3. Daniel A. Kaufmann
4. Quan Li
5. G. Biglaiser
6. Andrew Kerner
7. Sonal S. Pandya
8. Joseph L. Staats

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Quan Li
2. Pedro C. Vicente
3. Nathan M. Jensen
4. Aminur Rahman
5. Daniel A. Kaufmann
6. G. Biglaiser
7. Sonal S. Pandya
8. Joseph L. Staats

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Quan Li
2. Pedro C. Vicente
3. Aminur Rahman
4. Nathan M. Jensen
5. Daniel A. Kaufmann
6. S. Rose-Ackerman
7. Simplice A. Asongu
8. Benno Torgler

Citations in the corpus

• LEGAL CORRUPTION: LEGAL CORRUPTION (2011, methodology): “Consistently with our model, Hellman and Kaufmann (2004) focus on the impact of inequality on influence, which is reported to generate a self-reinforcing mechanism in which institutions are subverted.”
• Understanding corruption and firm responses in cross-national firm-level surveys (2010, background): “Scholars that use these firm-level survey data on the issue of corruption (e.g., Fisman & Gatti 2006; Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2006; Hellman & Kaufmann, 2004) have paid limited attention to the impact of nonresponse and false response on the assessment of corruption.”