Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule

By Bruce D. Smith. 2002

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/61895c28aac03de2d3effafc93c4075060442488

Citations in the corpus

• Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking? (2014, unknown): “…to moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), increase the opportunity costs for banks to hold cash, thus making risky alternatives more attractive (Smith (2002)), or even reduce the banks’ net worth or charter value enough to make a “gambling for resurrection” strategy attractive (Keeley (1990)).”
• Banks, Liquidity Management, and Monetary Policy (2014, unknown): “First, because of macroprudential concerns, the Fed may want to reduce the amount of bank credit and use monetary policy for such an objective, as advocated by Stein (2012). Another concern relates to the costs of eliminating liquidity premia.”