The Clan and the Corporation: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe
By A. Greif, Guido Tabellini. Social Science Research Network, 2015
357 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines – analytically and historically – the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.
Subfields: Demography, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6151c1d1719d2804e3f42dceb46484d72ff6eb5a
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Citations in the corpus
- Climate Risk, Cooperation and the Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions (2017, background): “A recurrent finding in this literature is the strong complementarity between the quality of political institutions and norms of cooperation, which has been studied both theoretically and empirically (Tabellini, 2008; 2010; Nannicini et al., 2013; Padró i Miquel et al., 2015; Guiso et al., 2016; Grei”
- Kinship Systems, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Culture (2018, neutral): “, morality, religious beliefs, or institutions feed back into the structure of kinship systems and hence contribute to the formation of internally consistent cooperation systems, akin to the mechanisms in the models of Tabellini (2008b) and Greif and Tabellini (2017). If historical kinship tightness”