Why Bank Governance is Different

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “Investors (the outsiders) cannot perfectly monitor managers acting on their behalf since managers (the insiders) have superior information about the performance of the company.”
Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, background): “…of regulatory guidelines and initiates (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; European Union 2010) and echoing the view of numerous academics and policy makers (Becht et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Bolton et al., 2015), indicates that bank boards should favor a stakeholder approach.”
Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk: International Evidence (2014, unknown): “…bank risk as reflected in market measures of risk and the Z-score for a sample of US bank holding companies over the 2 Recent surveys are offered by Becht, Bolton, and Roell…”
Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature (2014, unknown): “Given more opacity and information problems in banks that lead to different bank governance as argued by Becht et al. (2011), this omission is important.”
The Leverage Ratchet Effect (2017, unknown): “In discussing governance in banking, Becht et al (2011) also note that creditor governance is particularly weak for banks, which can lead to excessive leverage and risk.”