Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-based Regulation

By Ingo Vogelsang. Social Science Research Network, 2006

117 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical for direct implementation, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a “used and useful” criterion.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5ee064f13fd6aa2c6afd1c0c205472a1c7fc6e25

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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

  1. Jack Clark
  2. Gillian K. Hadfield

In Management Science and Operations Research

  1. Jack Clark
  2. Gillian K. Hadfield

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