Mandatory Audit Firm Turnover, Financial Reporting Quality, and Client Bargaining Power: The Case of Arthur Andersen
By Albert L. Nagy. 2005
182 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5e52d99db6437f2aa585c2bbb11ad30eb40f8604
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Michael Firth
- Oliver M. Rui
- Xi Wu
- M. Cameran
- Annalisa Prencipe
- M. Trombetta
- Theodore J. Mock
- Jerry L. Turner
In Strategy and Management
- Xi Wu
- M. Cameran
- Annalisa Prencipe
- Michael Firth
- Theodore J. Mock
- Jerry L. Turner
- David Manry
- M. Trombetta
Citations in the corpus
- Does Increased Audit Partner Tenure Reduce Audit Quality? (2008, result): “Our results relating to audit partner tenure are consistent with the conclusions about audit firm tenure by Johnson et al. (2002), Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), Myers et al. (2003), and Nagy (2005) and extend their findings by focusing on individual audit partners rather than on audit firms.”
- How Do Various Forms of Auditor Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from China (2012, background): “For example, some find that mandatory audit firm rotation is associated with enhanced FRQ/AQ (Nagy, 2005; Cahan and Zhang, 2006; Krishnan, 2007), while others do not (Blouin et al.”
- Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality (2016, result): “Other studies use the US Arthur Andersen (AA) collapse in 2002 as a mandatory audit firm rotation setting, with conflicting results (Blouin, Grein, & Rountree, 2007; Cahan & Zhang, 2006; Krishnan, 2007; Krishnan, Raghunandan, & Yang, 2007; Nagy, 2005).”