The Economic Peace Between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions

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The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions (2007, background): “…autocracies Democracies more likely than autocracies to be targets of sanctions Autocracies more likely than democracies to be targets of sanctions Lektzian and Souva (2003) Damrosch (1993) Lektzian and Souva (2003) Hart (2000) Nooruddin (2002) Lektzian and Souva (2003)∗ Pape (1997) Cox and Drury…”
An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success (2007, methodology): “For cases involving multiple senders or targets, we disaggregate them into distinct dyads following the coding rules of Lektzian and Souva (2001, 2003) and Nooruddin (2002).”
Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy (2010, background): “In order to avoid any bias resulting from case selection, we exclude all liberal/consolidated democracies from the analysis since these regimes are rarely sanctioned and score at the upper limit of democracy scores ( Cox and Drury 2006 ; Lektzian and Souva 2003 ).”
Economic sanctions (2013, background): “Regime type has also been found to be an important factor affecting sanctions onset (Lektzian & Souva, 2003; Cox & Drury, 2006) and military conflicts (Ray, 2003).”