The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending

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The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality (2016, unknown): “Since IMF programs are not randomly assigned but usually take place during economic crises, simple comparisons of cases with and without programs would be plagued by severe endogeneity (Vreeland 2007a).”
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “5 See, for example, Bjork (1995), Dixit (1996), Edwards and Santaella (1993), Putnam (1988), Remmer (1986), Smith and Vreeland (2006), Spaventa (1983), Stein (1992), Vaubel (1986), and Vreeland (2003).”
Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, unknown): “6 At the same time, the increasing number of conditions in the 1980s and 1990s appears to have eroded compliance and “ownership” of reforms by IMF clients (Bird 2009; Vreeland 2006).”
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, unknown): “After all, it is well known that non-compliance is not rigorously punished by the Fund (e.g., Killick 2006; Vreeland 2006, 2007).”