Accounting restatements and information risk

By Todd D. Kravet, Terry Shevlin. 2010

243 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5cc6231743bfb25a78690146181aa96359425a73

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Citations in the corpus

On the Value of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: An Empirical Investigation of Corporate Bond Issues in China (2018, background): “Fombrun (1996) and Kravet and Shevlin (2010) indicate that firms’ past behaviors and positions will influence stakeholders’ beliefs about the precision of information.”
Textual risk disclosures and investors’ risk perceptions (2013, unknown): “…after December 2005) is 4 A related strand of literature examines how information precision and asymmetry affect the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004; Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2009; Kravet and Shevlin 2010).”
The Real Effects of Disclosure Tone: Evidence from Restatements (2011, unknown): “The extant literature as well as Table 3 indicate that between 5% and 18% of restatements are initiated by auditors, while between 12% and 25% are initiated by the SEC or some other agency (Kravet and Shevlin, 2010; Gleason et al., 2008; Chen and Lai, 2007; Palmrose et al., 2004).”
Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “Kravet and Shevlin (2009) document a significant increase in the pricing of information risk after restatement announcements. Litigation: Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that 38 percent of restatements are associated with litigation, including litigation actions against the company, officers, direct”
The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives (2013, background): “As a result, the level of uncertainty in the market for the firm’s shares may increase (e.g., Kravet and Shevlin, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2012).”
Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements (2009, unknown): “[2006], Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Gleason et al.”
Conditional conservatism and cost of capital (2011, background): “these contracting benefits of conservatism, LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conditional conservatism is expected to “lower information asymmetry between managers and outside investors” and that “conservative financial reports are likely to generate a more informed capital market.”
The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation (2013, unknown): “Since poor accounting quality widens the information gap between firm insiders and outside investors (Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman, 2010; Kravet and Shevlin, 2010) and increases the costs of adverse selection for potential bidders, Amel-Zadeh and Zhang (2010) show that firms with poor accou”