Organized labor and information asymmetry in the financial markets

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Employee Rights and Acquisitions (2015, unknown): “Hilary (2006) argues that management facing strong organized labor seeks to preserve information asymmetries to retain an advantage in collective bargaining, resulting in higher bid-ask spreads, lower trading volume, lower analyst following, and a higher probability of informed trading.”
Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure (2015, methodology): “If 23 The use of unionization at the industry-level (which is consistent with Hilary 2006), is supported by prior literature which suggests that the pressure of unions is not limited to their own firms but spills over to other firms in the same industry (e.g., Rosen 1969).”