The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust

By Joseph Farrell, M. Katz. 2006

110 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5c5ddd4a0722b7fb67c826ba2d698c633633cbb2

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Citations in the corpus

• Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization (2014, unknown): “Note that for the case of royalty payments patent holder payoffs are given by (10) for the case of a pool, whereas for the case without a pool they are given by twice (12).”
• An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers (2012, background): “For instance, Farrell and Katz (2006) and Rosch (2006) discuss the pros and cons of a \total welfare" standard.”
• The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis (2013, unknown): “While there is still strong disagreement over whether consumer or social surplus is the appropriate standard to apply, there seems to be widespread agreement that one of these two, or some mixture of them, should be targeted (Farrell and Katz, 2006).”