Why proofs by mathematical induction are generally not explanatory

By Marc Lange. 2009

66 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Global and Planetary Change, History and Philosophy of Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bd8baf10f73884bd2321ac7458837ca793cc977

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Aidan Lyon
2. Marc Lange

In Global and Planetary Change

1. Aidan Lyon
2. Marc Lange

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. Aidan Lyon
2. Marc Lange
3. Christopher Pincock

Citations in the corpus

• What Are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does It Matter) (2010, background): “My argument that mathematical inductions are generally not explanatory (see Lange 2009a) presupposes that if the fact that the summation formula works for n 5 1 helps to explain why it works for every natural number, then in particular, the fact that the summation formula works for n 5 1 must help…”
• Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism (2012, background): “There is some controversy over which are the explanatory proofs and which are not [Lange 2009], and the philosophical details of such explanations have not yet been worked out.”