Can corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? An empirical analysis
By Eliezer M. Fich, S. Slezak. 2008
229 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bc4214fdcfa92699d91c2b7f3b143fd8c963c89
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In Accounting
- A. M. Priego
- Ramadan El-Faitouri
- Elena Merino
- Jannine Poletti‐Hughes
- S. F. Shah
- S. Akbar
- M. Manzaneque
Citations in the corpus
- More on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the UK : evidence from the application of generalized method of moments estimation (2016, background): “5 the prospects for greater access to external funding (Claessens, Djankov & Klapper, 2003; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Amana and Nguyen, 2013).”
- Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Risk (2016, unknown): “Byrd and Hickman (1992) report that independent boards are more likely to remove CEOs because of poor performance and Fich and Slezak (2008) suggest that firms with more independent boards are better able to avoid bankruptcy after entering distress.”
- Corporate governance effect on financial distress likelihood: Evidence from Spain (2016, background): “…of view, smaller boards and larger percentage of independent or outside directors are more effective in the implementation of mechanisms for corporate control (Jensen, 1993), thereby decreasing the chances of the company to achieve unstable economic and financial situations (Fich & Slezak, 2008).”