The Rational Design of International Institutions: The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape

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Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime (2008, methodology): “…that can constrain the abuse of such provisions; ~2! it legitimates the use 13+ See, for example, Sykes 1991; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; and Rosendorff and Milner 2001+ 14+ Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 794–95+ of such provisions insofar as it meets those standards, which in…”
Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU preferential trade agreements (2014, background): “PTA design is an important variable mediating the effects of labor provisions (e.g., Rosendorff and Milner 2001).”
Treaty Compliance and Violation (2010, background): “This is an example of a broader set of issues that is certainly relevant to treaty violation: how the agreement was written in the first place (Koremenos 2005; Koremenos et al 2001; Rosendorff & Milner 2001; Smith 2000).”
The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset (2013, background): “…actively to ongoing debates and advancements in research programmes as diverse as legalization (Abbott et al. 2001), rational design (Koremenos et al. 2001; Rosendorff and Milner 2001), diffusion (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Braun and Gilardi 2006), or overlapping regimes (Drezner 2006; Busch 2007).”