Enforceable security policies

By Fred B. Schneider. Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems], 2000

1,447 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b80e2aba51a4e2b8a48a0d4db4036b667df46ce

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Citations in the corpus

Binary stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code (2012, background): “Static Approaches: Static binary rewriting is a core technology for many applications, such as software fault isolation [58], static instrumentation, in-lined reference monitoring [49], and tamper-prooﬁng [3].”
Edit automata: enforcement mechanisms for run-time security policies (2005, neutral): “These automata are similar to Schneider’s original security monitors.”
Securing web application code by static analysis and runtime protection (2004, background): “Schneider [61] proposed formalizing security properties using security automata, which define the legal sequences of program actions.”
SoK: Eternal War in Memory (2013, neutral): “We cover enforcing this policy under Section VII-B.”
A Roadmap Toward the Resilient Internet of Things for Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, methodology): “This approach has been pioneered by the work of Schneider [145] on security automata which halt the program whenever it deviates from a safety requirement.”
Control-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications (2009, background): “CFGs can also be defined by explicit security policies, for example written as security automata [Schneider 2000].”
All You Ever Wanted to Know about Dynamic Taint Analysis and Forward Symbolic Execution (but Might Have Been Afraid to Ask) (2010, background): “Other formal mechanisms for defining such policies exist as well [54].”
Mop: an efficient and generic runtime verification framework (2007, background): “Since the safety properties are precisely the monitorable ones [42], MOP can therefore handle any safety property.”
Intrusion detection via static analysis (2001, background): “0-7695-1046-9(C) 2001 IEEE Ko et al., and others have proposed a very natural solution to this problem: every program should come with a specification of its intended behavior [21, 19, 22, 29].”
The software model checker Blast (2007, background): “The specification is usually given by program instrumentation that defines a monitor automaton [5,7,41, 79 ], which observes if a program execution violates the desired property, such as adherence to a locking or security discipline.”
Thorough static analysis of device drivers (2006, neutral): “We encode temporal safety properties in a C-like language that allows the definition of a safety automaton [43, 45].”
Mimicry attacks on host-based intrusion detection systems (2002, background): “This is fairly natural [20], as finite-state IDS’s can always be described as finite-state automata and thus accept a regular language of syscall traces.”
The Art, Science, and Engineering of Fuzzing: A Survey (2018, background): “However, fuzz testing can actually be used to test any security policy observable from an execution, i.e., EM-enforceable [183].”