International trade and labor-demand elasticities

By Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001

399 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b4535ebc1fdfe065a39382d2b586e66d3b4e105

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Citations in the corpus

DOES NATIONALITY OF OWNERSHIP MATTER FOR LABOR DEMANDS (2003, methodology): “This allows one to interpret the coef cient estimates on labor prices directly as labor-demand elasticities (with the key identifying assumption that labor is supplied perfectly elastically—see discussion in Slaughter 2001).”
From the Invisible Handshake to the Invisible Hand? How Import Competition Changes the Employment Relationship (2004, methodology): “Using industry-level data, Slaughter (2001) finds no evidence of a link between labor demand elasticities and trade-exposure measures.”
Openness and inequality in developing countries: a review of theory and recent evidence (2005, background): “…capital income lower (Rodrik, 1997), that reductions in corporation tax in one country increase the likelihood of reductions in another (Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2002), and that the responsiveness of the demand for labor to changes in wages has increased in recent decades (Slaughter, 2001).”
Trade Reforms, Labor Regulations, and Labor-Demand Elasticities: Empirical Evidence from India (2007, background): “The second channel works through one of Hicks-Marshallian laws of factor demand which can be stated as follows: “The demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce” (See Hicks (1963) and Slaughter (2001)).”
Multiple large shareholders and corporate investment: Evidence from China (2018, positive): “Following previous studies (e.g., Slaughter, 2001; Chen et al., 2011b; Chen et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2015), we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) test.”
Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production (2002, neutral): “Slaughter (2001) estimates that demand for U.S. production labor in manufacturing became more elastic from 1960 to the early 1990s, and that these increases were correlated with FDI outflows by U.S.-headquartered MNEs.”
Globalization and Politics (2000, background): “The potential of substituting foreign workers and production for domestic workers and production reduces labor’s bargaining power by making the demand for domestic labor more elastic (Rodrik 1997:16–27, Slaughter 1997).”
Trade liberalization and labor demand elasticities: evidence from Turkey (2001, neutral): “While the primary focus of this research has appropriately been on the direct impact of greater openness on employment, wages and particularly on wage inequality (between high and 2 low-skilled workers), the literature (for instance, Rodrik (1997) and Slaughter (1997)) has emphasized yet another lin”
Adjusting Labour Demand: Multinational vs. National Firms. A Cross-European Analysis (2003, methodology): “The footloose nature of MNEs is investigated with a more direct approach in Gorg and Strobl (2002) and Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2002) who compare MNEs' subsidiaries and NEs in Ireland and the United Kingdom, respectively.”
Human Capital and Wages in Exporting Firms (2008, background): “Also there is solid empirical evidence showing that spill-overs from the product market to the labour market exist, see e.g. Blanch(cid:135)ower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Hildretch and Oswald (1997), Slaughter (2001) and Arai (2003).”
Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? (2017, background): “Fordham and Kleinberg 2012, 321–22; Lupia 1994; 63; Popkin 1994; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 43.”
The Own-Wage Elasticity of Labor Demand: A Meta-Regression Analysis (2014, neutral): “…panel, admin 1976-1995 Krishna et al. (2001) intermediate-run, unconditional reduced-form, ex/endogenous wage, FE firm-level, panel, admin 1983-1986 Slaughter (2001) intermediate-run, unconditional reduced-form, exogenous wage, FE industry-level, panel, admin 1961-1991 Bellmann et al. (2002)…”
Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment (2017, background): “See, for example, Blonigen 2008; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001.”
Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization (2017, background): “…on trade liberalization, it also contributes to the empirical literature on the domestic politics of trade policy-making (e.g., Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).”