Balancing Performance Measures

By S. Datar, Susan Cohen Kulp, Richard A. Lambert. 2001

381 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b443b00fa0e0cdbd7b8bbe791b2ff6eaa273c2d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Jan Bouwens
2. Laurence van Lent
3. David F. Larcker
4. Frank Selto
5. M. Malina
6. Christopher D. Ittner
7. Margaret A. Abernethy
8. Robert M. Bushman

In Strategy and Management

1. David F. Larcker
2. Christopher D. Ittner
3. Jan Bouwens
4. Laurence van Lent
5. Frank Selto
6. M. Malina
7. Robert M. Bushman
8. Rick Lambert

Citations in the corpus

• Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance (2001, background): “An important example in this respect is DeAngelo’s (1988) study of the role of accounting information in proxy fights.”
• Contracting Theory and Accounting (2001, background): “However, before doing this, Datar et al. (2000) show that it is useful to rewrite the objective function as follows:”
• Psychology Models of Management Accounting (2010, background): “2Datar et al. (2003) also provide a model of this problem, which focuses more on weighting the measures, while Feltham and Xie’s (1994) analysis focuses more on the value of the measures.”
• Determinants of Control System Design in Divisionalized Firms (2004, background): “Datar et al. (2001) question whether sensitivity of a measure is an important determinant and demonstrate that the use of a measure is influenced by its importance in achieving organizational objectives (see also, Lambert 2001).”
• Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options (2001, background): “Bushman and Indjejikian (1993), Kim and Suh (1993), Feltham and Xie (1994), Hemmer (1996), Cohen, Datar, and Lambert (2000) , and Feltham and Wu (2000).”
• Strategy, Choice of Performance Measures, and Performance (2006, background): “Datar et al. (2001), Feltham and Xie (1994), Hemmer (1996), Holmstrom (1979), and Lambert (2001), for example, have demonstrated that in the absence of measurement costs, introducing incentives based on nonfinancial measures can improve contracting by incorporating information on managerial actions…”
• Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, background): “SEPTEMBER 16, 2004 3 R. GIBBONS Henderson and Clark, 1990), and knowledge (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).”