Management Quality, Financial and Investment Policies, and Asymmetric Information
By Thomas J. Chemmanur, Imants Paeglis, Karen Simonyan. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2009
142 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b3e3963f04c2ce3527945e6908f8b0fdf0dc255
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Karthik Krishnan
- Lei-Lei Kong
- Qianqian Yu
- Panayiotis Ch. Andreou
- C. Louca
- Isabella Karasamani
- D. Ehrlich
- Thomas J. Chemmanur
In Finance
- C. Louca
- Isabella Karasamani
- Lei-Lei Kong
- Qianqian Yu
- Panayiotis Ch. Andreou
- D. Ehrlich
- Karthik Krishnan
- Thomas J. Chemmanur
Citations in the corpus
- Readability of Narrative Disclosures in 10-K Reports: Does Managerial Ability Matter? (2018, unknown): “In the same vein, Chemmanur et al. (2009) suggest that better and more reputable managers can convey the intrinsic value of the firm more credibly to outsiders, reducing the information asymmetry about the firm in the equity market.”
- The Impact of Managerial Ability on Crisis-Period Corporate Investment (2017, result): “This view is also supported by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) and Switzer and Bourdon (2011) who document positive relations between firm management quality and IPO/SEO performance.”
- Top Management Human Capital, Inventor Mobility, and Corporate Innovation (2018, background): “Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) also use a similar approach to analyze the relationship between the management quality and financial policies of firms making seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).”
- Managerial Ability, Investment Efficiency and Stock Price Crash Risk (2017, unknown): “investment opportunities, thereby making better investment choices with a greater likelihood of successful project outcomes (Chemmanur et al., 2009). Trueman (1986) demonstrates analytically that more able managers are more likely to signal positively about the firm’s value compared to their less ab”