Framing in context: how interest groups employ framing to lobby the European Commission

By H. Klüver, C. Mahoney, M. Opper. 2015

113 citations recorded by the source corpus.

ABSTRACT Framing plays an important role in public policy. Interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of a policy proposal while ignoring others in order to gain an advantage in the policy debate. However, we know remarkably little about how interest groups choose their frames. This contribution therefore studies the determinants of frame choice during the policy formulation stage in the European Union. We argue that frame choice is a complex process which is simultaneously affected by interest groups as well as contextual characteristics. With regard to interest group characteristics, we expect that frame choice varies systematically across actor type. With regard to contextual characteristics, we hypothesize that the frames that interest groups employ are specifically tailored towards the DGs in charge of drafting the proposal. Our theoretical expectations are tested based on a new and innovative dataset on frame choice of more than 3,000 interest groups in 44 policy debates.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5a2958304247d5732274097f12a57f9d7bff2d3e

Citations in the corpus

• Legislative lobbying in context: towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union (2015, unknown): “…to the characteristics of the DG in charge of a legislative proposal offer an illuminating insight into how institutional responsibility within the European Commission plays an important role for interest group lobbying (Eising et al ., 2015; Bora¨ng and Naurin, 2015; Klu¨ver et al ., 2015).”