Robust Equilibria of Potential Games

By Takashi Ui. 2001

106 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Potential games are games with potential functions. Technically, the potential function defines a refinement concept. We provide justification for this refinement concept using the notion of robustness of equilibria. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the Nash equilibrium. We show that Nash equilibria that maximize potential functions are generically robust.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/597a212120d134030efc707961138df16c1b7739

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Global Games: Theory and Applications (2003, background): “If action profile a∗ is the strict maximum of a potential function v for complete information game g, we say that a∗ is potential maximizer of g. Ui (2001) shows that a potential maximizing action profile is necessarily robust to incomplete information.16 Many-player, two-action, symmetric payoff…”
Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019, unknown): “Arguments from Kajii and Morris (1997) and the follow-up literature (Ui 2001 and Morris and Ui 2005) can be used to analyze maxmin payoffs more generally when—as in the above example—the incomplete information game has each player either knowing that payoffs are given by a fixed complete…”