Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

By J. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann, Jarrad Harford. 2002

236 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/59730310c3b92eb2b31467c8eac95764acfb7b3d

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Citations in the corpus

Financing Under Extreme Risk: Contract Terms and Returns to Private Investments in Public Equity (2010, methodology): “Abnormal returns are computed using a benchmark portfolio that controls for size and book-to-market ratios; see Brav and Gompers (1997) and Chalmers, Dann, and Harford (2002).”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “…in the U.S is rare, as firms are generally not required to disclose detailed information about their insurance coverage.10 A notable exception is Chalmers, Dann, and Harford (2002) who, using proprietary data for a sample of IPO firms, find that the 3-year post IPO performance is negatively…”
Industry contagion in loan spreads (2012, unknown): “The average personal policy limit is C$46.5mm: this is considerably higher than the average policy limit reported in Chalmers et al. (2002), but firms in our sample of acquirers are also much larger than firms in their sample of IPOs.”
The Effect of Litigation Risk on Management Earnings Forecasts (2011, methodology): “The positive coefficient on dir_out is consistent with the findings in Chalmers et al. 2002 and Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2006.”
Directors׳ and officers׳ liability insurance and the cost of equity☆ (2016, methodology): “Following Chalmers et al. (2002) and Lin et al. (2011), we define DOICOV as the amount of personal coverage scaled by the average market value of equity of the year.”
Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions (2011, unknown): “Second, Core (2000) and Chalmers et al. (2002) argue that the purchase of D&O insurance represents opportunistic behavior on the part of managers and, as such, is often closely related to the quality of corporate governance.”
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes (2011, unknown): “Using a proprietary sample of 72 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US, Chalmers, Dann, and Harford (2002) find a negative relation between the amount of D&O insurance purchased at the time of the IPO and three-year post-IPO stock returns, suggesting that managerial opportunism affects D&O…”