The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services

By Jeffrey F. Timmons. 2005

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Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and primary commodities (2010, background): “…of state capacity, which is also quite common in political science and consistently used by those in the predatory theory tradition to model the behavior of both developed and developing states (e.g. Campbell, 1993; Cheibub, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Lieberman, 2002; Thies, 2005; Timmons, 2005).”
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution (2014, unknown): “42 Timmons 2005.”
Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland (2012, background): “Timmons (2005) finds that the more a state depends upon taxing richer citizens, the more it upholds property rights.”
The Origins of Voluntary Compliance: Attitudes toward Taxation in Urban Nigeria (2014, background): “6 Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1992; Timmons 2005.”
Going Where the Money Is: Strategies for Taxing Economic Elites in Unequal Democracies (2013, background): “3 Literature on fiscal bargaining argues that states can extract more revenue when taxpayers are granted representation or participation in governance or when spending benefits them directly (Bates & Lien, 1985; Brautigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008; Levi, 1988; Timmons, 2005).”