Concise security bounds for practical decoy-state quantum key distribution
By Charles Ci Wen Lim, Marcos Curty, N. Walenta, Feihu Xu, H. Zbinden. 2013
335 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Due to its ability to tolerate high channel loss, decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has been one of the main focuses within the QKD community. Notably, several experimental groups have demonstrated that it is secure and feasible under real-world conditions. Crucially, however, the security and feasibility claims made by most of these experiments were obtained under the assumption that the eavesdropper is restricted to particular types of attacks or that the finite-key effects are neglected. Unfortunately, such assumptions are not possible to guarantee in practice. In this work, we provide concise and tight finite-key security bounds for practical decoy-state QKD that are valid against general attacks.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Theory and Mathematics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/57d2f50168c9c9fb64da44090e2fa19ea5ee3517
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Citations in the corpus
- Secure quantum key distribution (2014, background): “Fortunately, QKD is composably secure [5, 6, 24].”
- Metropolitan quantum key distribution with silicon photonics (2017, methodology): “[66], we generate secret keys from all intensity settings.”
- Practical challenges in quantum key distribution (2016, neutral): “61,68 Room-temperature single-photon detectors have been shown to be suitable for DV-QKD over up to 100 km fi bre, thus removing cooling requirements for the entire QKD system; 44,69 for CV-QKD cooling is unnecessary.”