AJAE Appendix: Risk, Wealth and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets

By S. Boucher, C. Guirkinger. 2007

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Informal lending amongst friends and relatives: Can microcredit compete in rural China? (2010, background): “Boucher and Guirkinger (2007) argue that the role of the money lender is to capture the spillover demand due to credit rationing.”
Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries (2005, unknown): “Boucher and Carter (2002) and Boucher and Guirkinger (2004) discuss some of these issues and apply the theory to explain how observable patterns of production specialization and credit and insurance contract choices in a rural setting change with borrower wealth.”
Credit Constraints and Productivity in Peruvian Agriculture (2007, background): “As a result, informal lenders may be able to offer the types of low collateral, high interest rate loans that banks are unable to supply, thereby eliminating both quantity and risk rationing that households face in the formal sector (Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007).”
Access to Rural Credit Markets in Developing Countries, the Case of Vietnam: A Literature Review (2019, background): “Even in the research of Boucher and Guirkinger, the informal credit markets are likely to be preferred because of risk [48].”