Market Integration and Fairness: Evidence from Ultimatum, Dictator, and Public Goods Experiments in East Africa
By Jean Ensminger. 2001
118 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/57134616aa6c14a244b099f62889b9ba0d177b2f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Herbert Gintis
- Colin F. Camerer
- Samuel Bowles
- Robert Boyd
- R. Mcelreath
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas
In Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- Michael C. Burda
- Daniel S. Hamermesh
- Philippe Weil
- Colin F. Camerer
- K. McAuliffe
- Francesco Guala
- Luigi Mittone
- Dorsa Amir
In Safety Research
- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Samuel Bowles
- Herbert Gintis
- Michael Gurven
- Colin F. Camerer
- Robert Boyd
- Urs Fischbacher
Citations in the corpus
- “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005, background): “The only clear exception to the wage labor pattern occurs in the Orma UG data, where individuals who participate in wage labor (to any degree) make significantly higher offers than those who do not (Ensminger 2004).”
- Total Work, Gender and Social Norms (2007, background): “An alternative justification for the correlation between the strength of social norms and GDP can be inferred from experimental work conducted in rural Africa (Ensminger, 2004).”
- Total work and gender: facts and possible explanations (2012, methodology): “To examine this possibility we use a general measure of attitudes 13An alternative justification for the correlation between the strength of social norms and GDP can be inferred from experimental work conducted in rural Africa (Ensminger 2004).”
- Cross-cultural, developmental psychology: integrating approaches and key insights (2020, background): “For instance, Omra villagers treat the public goods game as they would their local tradition of community fundraising, known as harambee (Ensminger, 2004; Gurven & Winking, 2008).”
- Paradigmatic Experiments: the Dictator Game (2010, background): “The Orma, a group of pastoral-nomadic people living in Kenia, for instance do not fail to notice that the Public Goods game is structurally similar to the harambee – an institution used for fund-raising and other collective projects – and behave accordingly (Ensminger 2004).”
- Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution (2005, unknown): “See Ensminger (2001).”
- The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance (2011, background): “At the individual level, a number of scholars have also studiedmarket integration based on self-reports of wage labor participation (Ensminger, 2004), income earned from cash-cropping (Tracer, 2004), or number of visits to markets (Gurven, 2004a,b).”
- The Promise and Success of Lab-Field Generalizability in Experimental Economics: A Critical Reply to Levitt and List (2011, background): “…figuring out how a public goods game worked, an Orma participant in Kenya exclaimed “Harrambee!” because the game reminded her of a practice used to raise funds for public goods (such as building a school) in which a village official harangues people to contribute one by one [Ensminger, 2004].”