Properties of multiwinner voting rules

By Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron, Arkadii M. Slinko. Social Choice and Welfare, 2014

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a mapping that takes a collection of strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets of candidates of size k. In this paper we consider committee selection rules that can be viewed as generalizations of single-winner scoring rules, including SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, as well as several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations. We identify two natural broad classes of committee selection rules, and show that many of the existing rules belong to one or both of these classes. We then formulate a number of desirable properties of committee selection rules, and evaluate the rules we consider with respect to these properties.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5698e3e730a6b0fc912ef25b094efaf3b6a43555

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Lingxiao Huang
2. L. Elisa Celis
3. Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
4. Thomas J. Walsh
5. Arkadii M. Slinko
6. Piotr Faliszewski
7. Lihong Li
8. Prasad Raghavendra

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
2. Lingxiao Huang
3. L. Elisa Celis
4. Arkadii M. Slinko
5. Piotr Faliszewski

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
2. Lingxiao Huang
3. L. Elisa Celis
4. Thomas J. Walsh
5. Lihong Li

Citations in the corpus

• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting (2014, background): “This concept is related to the Droop proportionality criterion (Droop 1881) and Dummett’s solid coalition property (Dummett 1984; Tideman and Richardson 2000; Elkind et al. 2014), but is specific to approval-based elections.”
• Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory (2017, background): “Elkind et al. (2017b) refer to committee scoring rules where the score depends only on the position of the most preferred candidate as representation-focused rules.”
• Multiwinner Voting with Fairness Constraints (2017, background): “, consistency, monotonicity, and fair variants of weak unanimity or committee monotonicity; see [Elkind et al., 2014] for formal definitions) of the (unconstrained) voting rule.”