Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

By Michael J. Fishman, Kathleen Hagerty. 2003

303 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/568d901da449463f86ebe8449770175d12c04cc4

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Citations in the corpus

Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case of Multiattribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers (2006, unknown): “Researchers have investigated certain types of disclosure costs (Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986), costs of information acquisition by sellers (Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Shavell, 1994), consumers’ limited understanding of sellers’ disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty, 19”
Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes (2011, unknown): “…acquisition and dissemination (Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Shavell, 1994; Fishman and Hagerty, 2003; Dye and Sridhar, 1995; Stivers, 2004), or disclosure’s impact on competition (Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Cheong and Kim,…”
Securitization, Transparency, and Liquidity (2012, unknown): “In particular, it is commonplace to lay a good part of the blame for the crisis on the poor transparency of the ratings that accompanied these massive securitizations (see for instance the Financial Stability Forum Report, 2008, and IMF, 2008).”
To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, unknown): “If disclosure is costly (Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982), sellers will only reveal information down to a certain threshold of low quality.5 In other cases, sellers may know the quality of their own product with some probability (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988; Shin, 1994; Dye and Sridhar, 1995; Shin”
Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Disclosure, Liquidity, and Fund Performance (2014, unknown): “Section III presents the model and 2 This effect is similar to that of an increase in issuer or corporate disclosure, which has been shown to lead to more liquid capital markets (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Fishman and Hagerty (1998, 2003), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)).”
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice (2010, background): “…skirt the law when it comes to telling diners about cleanliness and health.” attentive consumers don't understand the disclosed content, or if consumers make naïve inferences about non-disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2004; Schwartz, 2005; Stivers, 2004).”
Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide (2013, unknown): “…can reduce the disclosing parties’ cost of capital, but may also impose cost on them in losing competitive advantage or bargaining power due to the revelation of information to their competitors (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Fishman and Hagerty (1998, 2003), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)).”
Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response (2007, background): “Dye’s 3Fishman and Hagerty (2003) actually consider a setting where a firm can disclose information about product quality to consumers.”
The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and corporate disclosure policy (2005, unknown): “This uncertainty can originate from differences in technical expertise to understand the disclosure among the firm’s investors (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003) or because it is unclear whether withholding disclosure results from firms having no information or having unfavourable information (Dye, 1985,…”
Quality Disclosure and Competition (2009, unknown): “Fishman and Hagerty [2003] adopt a monopoly model with two types of consumers: those who fully understand disclosed information, and those who observe whether information was disclosed (4)Matthews and Postlewaite [1985] turn common intuition on its head, by considering a model in which the firm choo”