Public Disclosure and Dissimulation of Insider Trades
By S. Huddart, John S. Hughes, Carolyn B. Levine. 2001
274 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5671f3660d01fe280af353a98cd3525e72bfa05c
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
In Finance
- Shmuel Baruch
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Kerry Back
- Arvind Krishnamurthy
- Peter Feldhütter
- Marcel Fratzscher
- Lasse Heje Pedersen
- Saki Bigio
Citations in the corpus
- Jeopardy, Non-Public Information, and Insider Trading Around SEC 10-K and 10-Q Filings (2005, unknown): “Another possibility is that 27 insiders may trade repeatedly on the same long-lived private information as outlined by Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001).”
- Information Leakage and Market Efficiency (2005, background): “The single insider in Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) employs a mixed strategy since his order size is made public after his order is executed.”
- Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Disclosure, Liquidity, and Fund Performance (2014, unknown): “We develop a model building on Kyle (1985) and Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) to allow for mandatory disclosure by informed traders at different frequencies.”
- Information in Securities Markets: Kyle Meets Glosten and Milgrom (2004, background): “Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) also show that informed traders may bluff, but in their model, traders are required to disclose their trades ex-post, and it is this disclosure that makes it profitable to bluff.”
- Legal Insider Trading and Market Efficiency (2008, unknown): “As pointed out by Huddart et al. (2001), the regulatory objectives of the public disclosure of insider trading are to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.”
- More Insiders, More Insider Trading: Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts (2010, unknown): “Cao and Ma (1999) and Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) analyze cases of homogeneously informed multiple and monopolistic risk-neutral insiders, respectively, whereas Bufia (2007) examines a monopolistic risk-averse insider.”