Veto Players and Referendums Around the World

By S. Hug, George Tsebelis. 2002

184 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5657d607a6a3043e8d873ba3edbc02b022c3ea28

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Steffen Ganghof
2. S. Hug

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Steffen Ganghof
2. S. Hug

In Strategy and Management

1. Steffen Ganghof
2. S. Hug

Citations in the corpus

• Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers (2015, unknown): “Furthermore, the effect of additional domestic interests or institutional blockades is operationalized with the veto player index (Armingeon et al., 2009; Hug and Tsebelis, 2002).”
• Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums (2004, background): “The only model which so far has addressed various types of referendums in a common framework is the article by Hug and Tsebelis (2002).”
• Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis (2003, background): “The theory cuts across long established categorizations of political systems and it systematically analyzes institutions such as direct democracy or presidentialism, which are not easy to deal with in Lijphart’s (1999) approach (Hug and Tsebelis 2001; Tsebelis 2002: 109-12).”