Long Cheap Talk
By R. Aumann, Sergiu Hart. 2003
339 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/558acbe26c670509c2aa898cd059f0b00940302d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Jacob William Crandall
- Thomas Rønde
- Cornelia Holthausen
- Marco Battaglini
- Jesús López-Rodríguez
- A. García-Lorenzo
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Jacob William Crandall
- Thomas Rønde
- Cornelia Holthausen
- Marco Battaglini
- Attila Ambrus
- Satoru Takahashi
- Gilat Levy
- Ronny Razin
Citations in the corpus
- Cooperation in International Banking Supervision (2004, positive): “In recent work on cheap talk games where only the sender has private information, Aumann and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2003) have shown that it can lead to a Pareto improvement to break the deterministic link between types and equilibrium outcomes.16 Whether and when this is also the case…”
- Learning to Interact with a Human Partner (2015, background): “Cheap talk refers to non-binding, unmediated, and costless communication [9, 1].”
- Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts (2004, background): “Given (2), each agent is characterized by an ideal point x and weights γi.”