Generalized expected utility, heteroscedastic error, and path dependence in risky choice
By David E. Buschena, David Zilberman. 2008
68 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/556fd47d0d26ebb88c9f8dde35f362c0d835a66e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Pavlo R. Blavatskyy
- Annalisa Conte
- John Hey
- Nathaniel T. Wilcox
- P. Moffatt
- Glenn W. Harrison
- E Elisabet Rutström
In General Decision Sciences
- Pavlo R. Blavatskyy
- Annalisa Conte
- John Hey
- Nathaniel T. Wilcox
- P. Moffatt
- Glenn W. Harrison
- E Elisabet Rutström
Citations in the corpus
- Mixture models of choice under risk (2011, background): “Some of the empirical literature adopted the strategy of trying to find the best preference functional individual by individual; see, for example, Hey and Orme (1994) and Gonzales and Wu (1999).”
- Stochastic models for binary discrete choice under risk: a critical primer and econometric comparison (2008, background): “Buschena and Zilberman (2000) and Loomes et al.”
- Models of Stochastic Choice and Decision Theories: Why Both are Important for Analyzing Decisions (2010, unknown): “Hey (1995) and Buschena and Zilberman (2000) extend a Fechner model of random errors by assuming that the error term is heteroscedastic; i.e., the standard deviation of errors is higher in Copyright 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl.”
- Stochastically more risk averse: A contextual theory of stochastic discrete choice under risk (2011, background): “Buschena and Zilberman (2000) and Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) point out that the best-fitting stochastic model may depend on the structure estimated and offer empirical illustrations of this sensible econometric point.”
- Stochastic Utility Theorem (2008, background): “For example, Camerer (1989) reports that 31.6% of subjects reversed their choices when presented with the same binary choice problem for the second time. Starmer and Sugden (1989) find that 26.5% of all choices are reversed on the second repetition of a decision problem. Hey and Orme (1994) report a”