Off-the-record communication, or, why not to use PGP

By Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, Eric A. Brewer. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, 2004

347 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54dbe31cf8d2f03c68d7aead52ea94bd49117223

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In Computer Networks and Communications

Citations in the corpus

CONIKS: Bringing Key Transparency to End Users (2015, methodology): “To demonstrate the practicality of CONIKS and how it interacts with existing secure communications services, we implemented a prototype CONIKS Chat, a secure chat service based on the Off-the-Record Messaging [8] (OTR) plug-in for the Pidgin instant messaging client [1, 27].”
A privacy threat analysis framework: supporting the elicitation and fulfillment of privacy requirements (2011, neutral): “Anonymous credentials (single show [53], multishow [54]) × × Deniable authentication [55] × × × Off-the-record messaging [56] × × × ×”
Vanish: Increasing Data Privacy with Self-Destructing Data (2009, background): “Other countries such as the U.K. [43] require release of keys, and coercion or force may be an issue in yet other countries. tractive, but as the original OTR paper observes, this approach is not directly suited for less-interactive email applications, and similar arguments can be made for OTR’s uns”
Vuvuzela: scalable private messaging resistant to traffic analysis (2015, neutral): “Recent work has shown that secure messaging systems can provide end-to-end encryption at scale, starting from systems such as OTR [6, 22], Axolotl [31], and TextSecure [30], and now being deployed by WhatsApp [29].”
Dissent: accountable anonymous group messaging (2010, background): “In anonymous communication scenarios, we often desire not just anonymity but also repudiability [6]: after a protocol run, no one should be able to prove to a third party which message any member sent, or ideally, whether a member participated at all.”
Privacy-Friendly Aggregation for the Smart-Grid (2011, background): “Forward secrecy [19, 13, 20] is desirable to minimize the impact of a potentially leaked private key.”
Privacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering (2014, methodology): “The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [210] software as well as S/MIME standards [161] may be used to protect email correspondences end-to-end; the Off-The-Record messaging (OTR) [38] protocols are widely supported by clients software to protect instant messaging conversations.”
Moat: Verifying Confidentiality of Enclave Programs (2015, methodology): “We implement the oﬀ-the-record messaging protocol [13], which provides perfect forward secrecy and repudiability for messages exchanged between principals A and B .”
A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol (2017, background): “Signal’s asymmetric ratcheting, which it inherits from the design of OTR [16], has been claimed to offer properties such as “future secrecy”.”