Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer

By Loi Luu, Jason Teutsch, Raghav Kulkarni, Prateek Saxena. 2015

264 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems

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Citations in the corpus

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, neutral): “Blockchains for verifiable computations and secure multi-party computations: Several related works offer blockchain-based guarantees of computation integrity, but cannot guarantee privacy [58,85,86].”
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts (2018, background): “This stands in comparison to Ethereum, which is capable of processing a total of approximately 1600 hashes per second (limited by Ethereum’s global gas limit, which is required due to the Verifier’s Dilemma).”
A Survey of Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts (SoK) (2017, background): “Despite some criticism about the effectiveness of the consensus protocol [37,44], recent theoretical studies establish its security whenever the honest nodes control the majority of the computational power of the network [39,52].”
Making Smart Contracts Smarter (2016, background): “Thus, the adversary can choose diﬀerent block timestamps to manipulate the outcome of timestamp-dependent contracts.”
A Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains (2016, background): “Further, increasing the amount of veriﬁcation check will slow down the block broadcast, and further pose a security threat in the consensus protocol as pointed out by previous work [41].”
Centrally Banked Cryptocurrencies (2015, background): “Beyond scalability, recent issues in the Bitcoin network have demonstrated that the incentives of miners may be misaligned,3 and recent research suggests that this problem — namely, that miners are incentivized to produce blocks without fully validating all the transactions they contain — is only ex”
Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—A Systematic Review (2016, background): “Luu et al. [46] present a security attack called the verifier’s dilemma, which drives rational miners to skip verification where the verifying transactions require significant computational resources in Bitcoin and especially in Ethereum.”
SoK: Consensus in the Age of Blockchains (2017, background): “Collectively, miners should have an interest in the long-term success of the cryptocurrency—but in the short term, miners may deviate from the honest mining strategy to maximize their profit [15, 38, 68].”
Integrated Blockchain and Edge Computing Systems: A Survey, Some Research Issues and Challenges (2019, methodology): “To solve this bottleneck, a framework of computation through a scriptable cryptocurrency [87], called Ethereum computer, allows users to outsource computations to the network, which will receive incentive payments for the correct computation results.”
A Blockchain-Based Approach to Health Information Exchange Networks (2016, background): “These smart contracts can be placed directly on the blockchain as transactions[27], providing not only assurances of validity but an audit mechanism as well.”
A scalable verification solution for blockchains (2019, background): “The consensus computer [50] shows how one can use the incentives in Ethereum to establish assumption (i) above both in theory and in practice.”
On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward (2016, background): “Some examples include [12] and [8], which analyze how strategic mining pools may attack competing pools in various ways, and [15], which analyzes how strategic Ethereum miners can trick others into wasting their computational”
BLOCKBENCH: A Framework for Analyzing Private Blockchains (2017, unknown): “ISBN 978-1-4503-4197-4/17/05. . . $15.00 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3035918.3064033”
A Vademecum on Blockchain Technologies: When, Which, and How (2019, background): “of eventual consistency [6], [234], [257], [258]) since forks may occur.”
Pervasive Decentralisation of Digital Infrastructures: A Framework for Blockchain enabled System and Use Case Analysis (2017, unknown): “cryptographic security [28], consensus algorithms [23], economics”
Blockchain Meets Cloud Computing: A Survey (2020, methodology): “The phenomenon was called the Veriﬁer’s Dilemma [117].”
ZEUS: Analyzing Safety of Smart Contracts (2018, background): “Most prior art in the area of smart contracts deals with security and/or privacy concerns in designing them [62], [64], [67], [73].”
Smart contract applications within blockchain technology: A systematic mapping study (2018, background): “Luu et al. (2015) presented several case studies conveying a verifier’s dilemma, whereby rational miners are well incentivised to accept invalidated blockchains in case the script execution takes excessive computational effort.”
A Survey on Ethereum Systems Security (2019, methodology): “This vulnerability can be mitigated by limiting the amount of computation that is required for verifying all transactions in a block [140].”